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 Abstract: 
A sequential weakly efficient two-auction game with entry costs, interdependence 
between objects, two potential bidders and IPV assumption is presented here in order to 
give some theoretical predictions on the effects of geographical scale economies on 
local service privatization performance. It is shown that the first object seller takes 
profit of this interdependence. The interdependence externality rises effective 
competition for the first object, expressed as the probability of having more than one 
final bidder. Besides, if there is more than one final bidder in the first auction, seller 
extracts the entire bidder’s expected future surplus differential between having won the 
first auction and having lost. Consequences for second object seller are less clear, 
reflecting the contradictory nature of the two main effects of object interdependence. On 
the one hand, first auction winner becomes “stronger”, so that expected payments rise in 
a competitive environment. On the other hand, first auction loser becomes relatively 
“weaker”, hence (probably) reducing effective competition for the second object. 
Additionally, some contributions to static auction theory with entry cost and asymmetric 
bidders are presented in the appendix. 
Resumen: 
Un juego secuencial formado por dos subastas débilmente eficientes, donde las 
valoraciones de los objetos son interdependientes, con dos posibles compradores bajo el 
supuesto de Valoración Privada Independiente (IPV), se presenta en este trabajo para 
dar algunas predicciones teóricas sobre los efectos de las economías de escala de tipo 
geográfico sobre el nivel de éxito en las privatizaciones de servicios de provisión 
pública local. Se demuestra que el vendedor del primer objeto se beneficia netamente de 
la interdependencia entre objetos. Esta interdependencia alienta la competencia efectiva 
por el primer objeto, expresada en términos de probabilidad de tener más de un 
comprador ex post.  Además, si hay más de un comprador en la primera subasta, el 
vendedor consigue extraer enteramente el diferencial de excedente neto esperado futuro 
entre el hecho de haber ganado la primera subasta y el de haberla perdido. Las 
consecuencias para el vendedor del objeto que se subasta en segundo lugar son menos 
claras, lo cual refleja la naturaleza contradictoria de los efectos principales de la 
interdependencia entre objetos. Por un lado, el ganador de la primera subasta se hace 
“fuerte”, al valorar más el segundo objeto, y por lo tanto los pagos esperados aumentan 
si la competencia es suficiente. Por otro lado, el perdedor de la primera subasta se 
“debilita” con respecto al ganador, con lo cual probablemente se reduce el nivel de 
competencia por el segundo objeto, en términos de probabilidad de participación de 
ambos compradores. En el apéndice a este trabajo, adicionalmente, se presentan avances 
teóricos relacionados relativos a la teoría de subastas con costes de entrada y 
compradores asimétricos. 
 
1. Introduction 
Since classical papers like Chadwick (1859) and Demsetz (1968), it is said that 
natural monopolies such as public utilities need not be owned or regulated by public 
organizations anymore. Demsetz’s idea was that, instead of regulating utility 
performance, proceeding to periodically auctioning off the right to supply the service 
would yield good efficiency results while saving information costs necessarily linked to 
service regulation. 
The debate on privatization of local services has evolved from the earlier 70’s 
through nowadays. During the 80’s, there was a wide consensus on the goodness of 
service privatization, understood as periodically auctioning it off to private firms. Cost 
savings were reflected into better service conditions for citizens or better fiscal balances 
for municipalities. 
In the nineties, some economists as Lopez-de-Silanes, Schleifer and Vishny (1996) 
tried to find out why privatization was not rapidly spreading over all municipalities and 
services despite its apparently clear advantages. Meanwhile, other economists started 
reconsidering the possibility that privatizing a public service could not be that beneficial 
for municipalities (Sclar, 2000). Competition issues were thought to be affecting 
privatization results. There is a trend towards progressive market concentration in the 
procurement and contracting-out sectors. Consequences of this process are definitely 
not good for municipalities and citizens. Here are two tables showing some data 
collected and summarized about a sample of Spanish municipalities’ privatized local 
services. 
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Table 1: Market concentration in the privatized refuse collection and treatment 
service in Spanish municipalities, 2000. 
Firm’s 
contracts 
Name Total 
number of 
contracts 
Contracts 
market 
share (%) 
Total anual 
treated waste 
(Tn) 
Treated waste 
per contract 
(Tn) 
Treated waste 
market share 
(%) 
46 FCC 46 29.68 1,069,516.37 23,250.36 46.86 
18 CESPA 18 11.61 371,923.36 20,662.41 16.30 
8 Vicens Orts 8 5.16 52,025.43 6,503.18 2.28 
7 BF-Iacsa 7 4.52 65,779.01 9,397.00 2.88 
4 Urbaser 4 2.58 201,879.53 50,469.88 8.85 
4 Ferran Vila 4 2.58 13,538.30 3,384.58 0.60 
3 3 firms 9 5.81 42,729.86 4,747.76 1.87 
2 10 firms 20 12.90 153,160.03 7,658.00 6.71 
1 39 firms 39 25.16 311,766.46 7,994.01 13.66 
 Total sample 155 100.00 2,282,318.34 14,724.63 100.00 
Source: Bel and Miralles (2004). 
 
Table 2: Market concentration in the privatized water supply service in Spanish 
municipalities, 2000. 
 Firms 
Contracts 
market 
share (%) 
Population 
served 
market share 
(%) 
Domestic 
consump. 
Market share 
(%) 
Industrial 
consump. 
Market share 
(%) 
Households 
served market 
share (%) 
Industrial 
consumers 
market share 
(%) 
AGBAR 75.00 95.49 94.84 93.57 95.28 96.86 
Prodaisa 6.25 0.13 0.18 0.10 0.16 0.07 
Seragua-FCC 3.13 1.02 1.32 2.04 1.22 1.32 
CASSA 3.13 0.79 0.72 0.92 0.70 0.48 
ABSA 3.13 0.58 0.58 0.34 0.55 0.62 
SOGESUR 1.56 0.75 0.88 0.11 0.74 0.00 
Aigües Vilanova 1.56 0.36 0.28 0.27 0.33 0.33 
ATCA 1.56 0.06 0.12 0.46 0.04 0.02 
Aigües de Vilassar 1.56 0.52 0.61 0.12 0.63 0.13 
Aigües de Catalunya 1.56 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.02 
AICSA 1.56 0.24 0.42 2.06 0.30 0.14 
Total sample 
64 
(contracts) 
3,241,563 
(citizens) 
166,132,498 
(m3) 
82,675,301 
(m3) 
1,347,434 
(users) 
167,517 
(users) 
HH index 0.5708 0.9122 0.8999 0.8766 0.9083 0.9384 
Source: Bel and Miralles (2004). 
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Market concentration in these sectors becomes higher as time goes by. 
Municipalities that had not yet privatized some public service could then be afraid that 
this loss of effective competition would harm potential gains arising from privatization. 
On the other hand, once a firm is effectively established in some little region, it is true 
that municipalities there that had not yet privatized could take profit of fixed costs 
savings through contracting this firm. But these fixed cost savings represent a clear 
advantage for the firm already established against firms that could compete for entering 
the region, thus explaining the trend towards a lesser degree of competition. 
Auction theory is one of the Economics fields that could address the issue of the 
trade-off between geographic economies of scale and successive competition for 
contracts among firms. In this paper, I construct a simple auction game that tries to get 
some light to the issue, being applicable to cases like the following one. 
Imagine that there is a little region with two municipalities that have some public 
service owned and managed by their own. There are two ex ante identical firms that 
would like to manage the service, because both are more efficient than the public 
providers are. Municipality 1 decides to privatize the service, putting it into contest. The 
two firms are potential contestants, but they have to choose carefully whether to enter 
the contest process or not, because doing so is costly. Firm 1 wins the contest and 
therefore the contract. Years later, municipality 2 privatizes the service, hence 
auctioning it off. Firm 1 could provide the service cheaply, since it is already installed 
in the region. These are good news for municipality 2. The bad news are that firm 2 may 
decide not to enter the auctioning process given its cost disadvantage, so that firm 1 
could both win the contract and enjoy almost the whole efficiency gain generated by the 
privatization. What will the aggregated effect be for municipality 2? Will it be better off 
if municipality 1 had not previously privatized the service? Does municipality 1 obtain 
good contract conditions thanks to the fact that there is a second municipality in the 
region that has not privatized the service? 
Some answers derived in this paper and applied to the questions above are 
summarized as follows. First, municipality 1 takes great profit of the fact that 
municipality 2 is going to privatize later. In fact, if both firm 1 and firm 2 participate in 
the first contest, municipality 1 fully extracts the expected future surplus differential 
between being already installed in the region and having to enter the region lately. 
Second, the aggregated effect for municipality 2 is not so clear, hence reflecting the 
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contradictory nature of the consequences of municipality 1’s privatization process. In 
some cases it could have been better for municipality 2 if municipality 1 had not 
previously privatized the service, while in other cases the opposite happens. 
The model is an independent private-values second-price sealed-bid sequential 
auction game with separate entry costs. More details are further explained. Other 
possible setups and assumptions could have been applied here, as common-values, first-
price, … The model chosen here has the advantage of being mathematically handy. The 
private-values assumption manages to give importance to the firm’s cost advantage fact, 
which is the central issue in this paper. The second-price sealed-bid auction is 
guaranteed to be efficient among the potential bidders that finally take part in the 
auction1, while this efficiency is not guaranteed in a first-price setup when bidders are 
not ex ante identical. Entry is assumed to be costly, as it is usual in this kind of 
contracting processes. 
The paper is organized as follows. Next section presents a short overview of auction 
theory with entry costs and of sequential auctions. Third section presents the model and 
derives several results. Section four analyses some implications of these results. Final 
section concludes. An appendix is included in order to make some points clearer. 
 
2. Auction theory with entry costs and sequential auctions 
Typically, the number of bidders that take part in an auction has been taken as 
exogenously fixed by a major part of the literature on auction theory. General results 
given this assumption are found and summarized in Milgrom (1989) and McAfee and 
McMillan (1987a). 
Nevertheless, there is a recent but growing literature that analyses bidders’ entry cost 
and its consequences on the entry decision (McAfee and McMillan, 1987b; 
Engelbrecht-Wiggans, 1993; Levin and Smith, 1994; Menezes and Monteiro, 1994; 
Stegeman, 1996; Campbell, 1998; Menezes and Monteiro, 2000; Lixin, 2002; Kaplan 
and Sela, 2002; Gal, Landsberger and Nemirovski, 2002; Tan and Yilankaya, 2003; 
Pevnitskaya, 2003; Landsberger and Tsirelon, 2003). Key contributions are Levin and 
                                                          
1 This is the concept of weak efficiency, as explained in Armstrong (2000). Any other auction mechanism 
that is weakly efficient in this sense could have been used here instead of the second-price sealed-bid one, 
due to the Revenue Equivalence Theorem. 
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Smith (1996) and Menezes and Monteiro (2000), since they develop the basis of 
auctions with entry that is currently in use. 
Levin and Smith (1994) paper constitutes in part a critique against Engelbrecht-
Wiggans setup. In the latter, participation decision is a pure strategy. This leads in many 
cases to asymmetric equilibria even if potential participants are ex ante identical, which 
sounds unintuitive. Levin and Smith (1994) conceive participation decision as a mixed 
strategy. In their setup, one single indivisible object is to be sold by an auctioneer to one 
out of N potential bidders. Every potential buyer i has the same distribution function F 
with support on [0,v*], which reflects other bidder’s beliefs about ith-bidder’s possible 
valuation (or signal). Each final participant has to pay a constant positive cost c, which 
is common knowledge. Participation decision is taken before having knowledge of the 
own valuation (or signal). The auction mechanism, the number of potential entrants, and 
the number of final bidders become common knowledge as well. There is no reservation 
price. In this setup, they find interesting results, as an extension of the revenue 
equivalence to endogenous entry cases. They also find that market thickness (a high 
number of potential participants) may not be profitable for the seller. 
Menezes and Monteiro (2000) present a very similar model, but in this case 
participation decision is to be taken after having had knowledge of the own valuation 
(or signal). In this case, it is shown that bidders play so-called cut-off strategies or 
threshold strategies in the equilibrium. Each one bids obviously only if he participates, 
and he participates if his known valuation is higher than some own threshold value. 
Menezes and Monteiro find similar results to the ones of Levin and Smith, that is, 
revenue equivalencies and the fact that market thickness may not be good for the seller. 
In this paper, I use the Menezes and Monteiro’s setup, because it seems more 
appealing for the cases I analyze. I focus on cost features that are firm specific, so that 
they are private and previously known by the firm before engaging into the contest 
process. It is precisely contest participation what entails participation costs. Hence, 
valuations are typically known before taking the participation decision. 
Stegeman (1996) and Lixin (2002) study optimal auctions under participation costs. 
Campbell (1998) insights, among other things, into the possibility of having asymmetric 
equilibria even with symmetric players, in the Menezes-Monteiro setup. This possibility 
is deeply analyzed in Tan and Yilankaya (2003), who also analyze asymmetric bidders 
in the Menezes-Monteiro setup with second-price sealed-bid auctions. Kaplan and Sela 
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(2002) introduce an interesting variation in which valuations are common knowledge 
but entry costs are private uncorrelated information. Pevnitskaya (2003) focuses on 
first-price sealed-bid auctions with entry costs and risk-aversion variability among 
potential bidders. Gal, Landsberger and Nemirovski (2002) investigate to which extent 
partial participation cost rebating could be beneficial for the seller. Landsberger and 
Tsileron (2003), finally, contribute to the study of auctions with entry when valuations 
(signals) are correlated among potential bidders. They arrive to the conclusion that 
threshold equilibrium concept should be revisited when signals are correlated. In this 
paper, I get rid of the correlation assumption, hence avoiding tedious and difficult 
calculation. As noted above, the central issue of this paper is the effect of firm’s costs 
advantages on competition and contract conditions. Common features of each contract 
that is to be auctioned off are assumed to be non-random common knowledge. 
Another point of the model I present is that auctions with entry costs are sequentially 
undertaken. Menezes and Monteiro (1994) have presented a similar model to the one of 
this paper. The difference with my assumptions is that the former assumes that once a 
bidder wins the first object, he is not interested in the second one, while my model 
imposes no limit on the number of objects a bidder could obtain. Bremzen (2003) also 
studies sequential auctions and associated entry deterrence strategies, in two sequential 
auctions for identical objects where there is a potential new entrant in the second 
auction. 
Finally, I shall quote the work of Gandal (1997), which is an empirical paper that 
deals with the issue I try to explain. The paper studies sequential cable television license 
sales taken at Israel. The winner of the auction for a region had a cost advantage in 
further auctions to be done in bordering regions. The paper assesses this cost reduction 
and concludes that in the case under study, the cost-reduction effect has outweighed the 
loss-of-competition effect. Gandal observes that there is no theory trying to explain this 
issue. Here it is. 
 
3. The model 
Consider the following sequential auction game, which will be called the 
ORIGINAL GAME in what follows. There are two risk-neutral bidders competing for 
obtaining either one or both of two objects. Objects are sold sequentially and separately 
in second-price sealed-bid auctions with no reservation prices. For the first one, ex ante 
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valuations are believed by bidders to follow a distribution F over the support [0,v*]. 
Valuations are always independent between bidders. Bidders’ beliefs in the second stage 
depend on the outcome of the first stage: 
a) If bidder 1 wins the first auction, his valuation will follow a distribution function 
G over the previous support, while bidder 2 will maintain the same distribution 
function F. G first order stochastically dominates F. 
b) If bidder 2 wins the first auction, the converse will happen. 
c) If none of the bidders enter the first auction, then both bidders will have the 
same distribution function F again. 
Taking part in each auction has a known cost c ( *0 vc << ) for each participant, so 
that participation decisions in any, none or both auctions become endogenous. Before 
each bidder  decides whether to participate in the second auction or not, he gets 
knowledge of his own real valuation . Before each bidder i decides on participation 
in the first auction, he gets knowledge of his valuation for the first object , but not for 
the second ( ). There is a common unity discount factor between auctions. 
}2,1{∈i
2
iv
1
iv
2
iv
The game is readily solved by backward induction. Hence, I shall start by 
considering stage 2, the auction of the second object, in any of the cases a, b and c. 
Case a. Bidder 1 has won the first auction, and we proceed to the second one: 
In this kind of auctions with entry, with no consequences on the future, it is well 
known that bidder’s strategy involves two actions: a bidding function (given 
participation) and a participation function, which depend on bidder’s valuation. Given 
participation, a weakly dominating bidding function consists of revealing the true 
valuation. This is standard in Vickrey auctions and is not explained here. From this 
optimal bidding, an expected profit function given participation is derived. This helps us 
find the participation function. Expected profits are increasing in the own valuation. 
Valuations below or equal to some threshold point iθ ( *)vc i ≤≤θ suggest bidder i deter 
from participating, as expected profits of doing so are non-positive. Above this 
threshold, participating is the right decision, as expected profits are positive. Hence, this 
sequence of actions is usually called threshold strategy, which typically depends on the 
other bidder’s threshold strategy (take into account that the other bidder’s threshold 
value positively affects expected profits given participation). Optimal responses are 
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represented by the optimal threshold function , as the bidding function is already 
known. Threshold equilibrium or cut-off equilibrium 
)(# ji θθ
*)*,( ji θθ  is reached where Nash 
equilibrium conditions hold, that is, at some point where each threshold strategy is 
optimal for any bidder. 
In case a, bidder 1’s expected profits when participating, given some bidder 2’s 
threshold strategy 2θ  and bidder 1’s known valuation  av1 2, is 
[ ] ( )
cdxxmaxF
cdxxfxvvIvF
cvvvmaxEFvF
a
a
v
v aaa
aaaa
−=
=−−>+=
=−>−−+
∫
∫
1
1
2
0 2
12112
2221212
}),{(
)()(}{)(
},0{)(1)(
θ
θθ
θθθ
θ  
Here, is bidder 2’s valuation, unknown by bidder 1, and I{} is an index function 
defined as usual. I have skipped some steps but arriving to these results is not extremely 
difficult. Last equality is reached by means of integration by parts. Bidder 1’s optimal 
threshold strategy is the valuation that makes expected profits given participation equal 
zero 
av2
cdxxmaxF
a
=∫ )(0 22
#
1 }),{(
θθ θ  
whenever this optimal strategy is lower than v*. The optimal threshold would be 
equal to v* if and only if3
cdxxmaxF
v ≤∫ *0 2 }),{( θ  
Notice that it always happens that , as bidder i knows for sure that the 
other bidder is almost never going to take part in the auction. 
cvi =*)(#θ
Bidder 2’s expected profits under similar conditions become 
cdxxmaxG
av −∫ 20 1 }),{( θ  
and optimal threshold strategy is derived analogously. A cut-off equilibrium for case 
a is a pair such that . There could be [ ]221 *,*)*,( vcaa ∈θθ **)(*;*)( 21#212#1 aaaaaa θθθθθθ ==
                                                          
2 The superscript refers to case a, and both valuation and threshold value refer to the second auction. 
3 Notice that I restrict attention to threshold strategies defined on the compact interval [0,v*] (in practice, 
they become restricted to [c,v*]). While this is not necessary, it makes further calculations clearer. 
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multiple equilibria. Existence has already been proved (see Miralles, 2002). We can also 
state (see Lemma 1) in this case that there will exist an equilibrium  such that 
. As G dominates F, 
*)*,( 21
aa θθ
** 21
aa θθ ≤ [ ]*,0)()( vxxFxG ∈∀≤ , and, supposing that both 
bidders play the same threshold strategy, bidder 2’s expected profits given participation 
are lower or equal than bidder 1’s ones. Hence, playing the same strategies may seldom 
be threshold equilibrium, and a possible “natural” readjustment suggests that the 
weakest bidder should rise threshold strategy in the equilibrium, while the strongest one 
should lower it. 
 
Lemma 1:4
Consider a two-neutral-bidder, independent private-values, second-price sealed-bid 
auction with common and known entry cost c ( *0 vc << ), where each bidder knows his 
own valuation before taking a decision about participating in the auction. Bidder 1’s 
valuation is an observation from a random variable with distribution function G with 
support on [0,v*]. Bidder 2’s valuation is extracted from a distribution function F with 
identical support. G first order stochastically dominates F, and both are common 
knowledge. 
Then, this auction game has at least one cut-off equilibrium 
[ ] [ ]*,,*)*,( 21 vc GF θθθθ ×∈ , where *vc GF <≤< θθ and thetas are defined as the unique 
solutions for 
cG
cF
GG
FF
=
=
θθ
θθ
)(
)(
 
Proof: 
By the definition of expected profits with participation given above, it can be seen 
that , . First order domination implies FF θθθ =)(#1 GG θθθ =)(#2 [ ]*,0)()( vxxFxG ∈∀≤ , 
which consequentially implies GF θθ ≤ . These fixed points exist as  and 
exist, are continuos and their dominia and codominia are both [0,v*]. 
)(#1 xθ
)(#2 xθ
                                                          
4 This is a refinement on a special case of Tan and Yilankaya (2003) proposition 4. I also generalize their 
proposition in the appendix. 
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For any bidder i, is strictly decreasing on x whenever . This can be 
readily understood: increasing the other bidder’s threshold value increases own 
expected profits given participation for any possible valuation, making the own optimal 
threshold strategy decrease. 
)(# xiθ *)(# vxi <θ
As optimal threshold functions are decreasing, continuos and defined over the 
compact set [0,v*]2, and  imply that is closed under FF θθθ =)(#1 GG θθθ =)(#2 )(#1 xθ
[ ] [ *,, vc FF ]θθ ×  (recall ) and that  is closed under cv =*)(#1θ )(#2 xθ [ ] [ *,, vc GG ]θθ × . 
Hence, both functions are closed under the compact intersection set [ ] [ ]*,, vc GF θθ × . By 
Brower’s fixed-point theorem, this implies that an intersection between both optimal 
threshold functions, i.e. a cut-off equilibrium, must be in this set. QED 
 
An important generalization of this lemma can be found in the appendix. Lemma 1 
has proven that, in our case a, there will exist at least one equilibrium  such 
that . Of course, there could be many such equilibria. There could be, though 
not necessarily, “not natural” equilibrium ,'( 1
a θθ that '' 21 aa θθ >  ( ncretely 
in the set {
*)*,( 21
aa θθ
** 21
aa θθ ≤
)'2
a  such more co
[ ] [ ]FGaa θθ )','( 11 ∈ r practical purposes, a more formal 
definition of what is considered  “natural” equilibrium follows below: 
cv θθ ,*, × })  5. Fo
Definition 1: A “natural” cut-off equilibrium of a second-price sealed-bid entry-
cost Menezes-Monteiro auction with two bidders where: 
- bidder 1’s valuation follows a distribution function G() over [0,v*] 
- bidder 2’s valuation follow a distribution function F() over [0,v*] 
- G first order stochastically dominates F 
 is the one and unique that comes as a result of iterated best responses when original 
threshold coordinates are either ),( FF θθ  or ),( GG θθ , where  
cG
cF
GG
FF
=
=
θθ
θθ
)(
)(
 
, regardless the identity of the bidder who first reacts to these original coordinates. 
We denote this “natural” equilibrium by the pair ),( HL θθ . 
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 The logic of this definition is straightforward and appealing. Imagine that there is a 
“first primitive” auction game where both players have the same distribution F. This 
game has one symmetric threshold equilibrium ),( FF θθ , so we start from this point. 
Suppose that bidder 1 changes its original distribution function by G, which dominates 
the previous one. ),( FF θθ  is then no longer an eq m (only bidder 1 would be in 
an optimal position), so departing from it bidder 2 reacts optimally by choosing 
FF θθθ ≥)(#2 . Bidder 1 counter-reacts by choosing FF θθθθ ≤))(( #2#1 . Bidder 2 reacts 
again by means of )()))((( #2
#
2
#
1
#
2 FF θθθθθθ ≥ , and so on. The process ends in the limit 
uilibrium ),( HL
uilibriu
when the eq θθ is reached. Notice that  
[ ] [ ] }))))(,(:,{(,{(),( #2#2 Ecmaxmax FHL ∈∈= θθθθθθθθ  
E
}))(,(:, #2 Ec F ∈∈ θθθθθ
, where  is the set of cut-off equilibria of this game. Now, imagine instead that we 
start from a “second primitive” game were both bidders’ valuations are extractions rom 
an 
 f
identical distribution function G. ),( GG θθ  is the induced symmetric cut-off 
equilibrium in this case. By analogous reasoning, if we now change bidder 2’s valuation 
distribution function by F, we would arrive again to ),( HL θθ . As a corollary, observe 
that the “natural” cut-off equilibrium when both players have identical distribution 
functions (they weakly dominate each other) is the symmetric equilibrium. I assume 
from now on that the “natural” equilibrium ),( HL θθ  is going to be played in case a. 
Expected profits for bidder 1 at the equilibrium becomes 
⎞⎛ ava 1 ⎟⎠⎝ 0⎜ −> ∫ cdxxmaxFvI HL1 }),{(}{ θθ  
It is useful, concerning stage 1, to calculate bidder 1’s expected profits before he 
knows his own valuation, 
⎝ 0
For bidder 2, equilibrium expected profits are 
⎞⎜⎛ −> ∫ cdxxmaxGvI ava 2 }),{(}{ θθ  
                                                                                                                                                                         
∫ ∫ ⎟⎞⎜⎛ −>== *01 }),{(}{)(v x HLwina dxcdzzmaxFxIxg θθππ  ⎠
⎟⎠⎝ LH 02
 
5 Tan and Yilankaya’s (2003) show some conditions for the impossibility of having these cases. 
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Notice that 
∈∀⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −>≤⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎛ −> ∫ θθθθ  
Bidder 2’s expected profits before learning his valuation is 
⎛ −>== *v xa θθππ
It is easy to check that 
[ ]*,0}),{(}{}),{(}{
00
vvcdxxmaxFvIcdxxmaxGvI
v
HL
v
LH ⎝ ∫
∫ ∫ ⎟⎠⎝0 02 }),{(}{)( LHlos dxcdzzmaxGxIxf  ⎞⎜
loswin ππ ≥ . 
Case b. Bidder 2 has won the first auction, and we proceed to the second one:  
This case is just the opposite of case a. By inverse argumentation, it is seen that 
there is a natural equilibrium ),( LH θθ which is assumed to be played. Hence: 
los
b ππ =1  and winb ππ =2 . 
Case c. None of bidders participate in the first auction, and we proceed to the second 
one: 
Is this case, it is readily seen that symmetric cut-off equilibrium ),( FF θθ  exists, 
where cF FF =θθ )( . Notice that HGFL θθθθ ≤≤≤ . This symmetric  is also 
a “
luations are 
⎝0 0 FF
It can be readily checked that 
 equilibrium
natural” equilibrium, so it is assumed to be played. Expected profits before knowing 
own va
⎞⎜⎛ −>=== *21 }),{(}{)(v xdracc dxcdzzmaxFxIxf θθπππ  ∫ ∫ ⎟⎠
losdrawin πππ ≥≥ . 
Stage 1. The first object is auctioned: 
Now that we have seen all the possibilities in the second stage, we turn to the first 
one  have consequences on the former, these 
con
idder i’s expected profit after knowing his own valuation vi for object 1 and 
dec
. As the result of the latter will
sequences must be taken into account by bidders when maximizing their payoff 
functions. 
Players are symmetric in this phase of the game, and therefore payoff functions are 
identical. B
iding to participate in the first auction, where j is the other bidder and bi( ), bj( ) are 
the bidding functions, is 
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 [ ] ( )
[ ]
[ ]
[ ] [ ]))()(,)(())()(()(1
)(1))((
}))()((1
))()(,)(())()(({)(1
))(( vF
jjiijjjjloswinijjjjiij
losjwinij
losjjjjii
jjiijjjjwinijjjjiij
winiji
vbvbvvbEvvvbvbPF
cFvF
cvvbvbP
vbvbvvbEvvvbvbPF
>>−−+>>⋅−+
+−⋅−++=
=−⋅>≥−+
+>>−+>>⋅−+
++=Π
θππθθ
πθπθ
πθ
θπθθ
πθ
 
Symmetry implies that we can assume symmetric bidding functions. By an argument 
that is typical of Vickrey auctions, it can be shown that optimal bidding is as follows: 
loswinji vvbvb ππ −+== )()( 6
This is due by the fact that real valuation for object 1 takes into account the different 
consequences that winning or loosing will have in the next auction. The effect is the 
same as the one of shifting the distribution function F and bidders’ valuations to the 
right. Hence, a typical Vickrey auction argument follows, and our bid is equal to this 
real valuation. 
Given that the optimal bidding strategy bi(vi) meets 0)(
=∂
Π∂
ii
i
vb
, by the Envelope 
Theorem 
[ ] ))()(()(1)( jjjjiijj
i
i
i
i vvbvbPFF
vdv
d θθθ >>⋅−+=∂
Π∂=Π  
As 
)(1
)()))(((
}))(({))()((
1
1
j
jiij
jiijjjjjii F
FvbbF
vbbIvvbvbP θ
θθθ −
−>=>>
−
−
i
 and 
, the latter due to symmetry, iij vvbb =− ))((1
}),{())()(}({)( ijjijij
i
i vmaxFFvFvIF
dv
d θθθθ =−>+=Π  
                                                          
6 We could also take into account a more general case where there is a common discount factor 10 ≤≤δ  
by an ex ante and some uncertainty about whether there is going to be a second auction or not, expressed 
probability  of having the second auction. It can be seen that in this general case 10 ≤≤ p
)()()( loswinji pvvbvb ππδ −⋅⋅+== . 
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When bidder i has the minimum possible valuation for object 1, that is, zero, given 
participation he can expect to lose the first auction with probability one if the other 
bidder also takes part in it, so that  
( ) losjwinji FFc πθπθ ⋅−+⋅+−=Π )(1)()0(  
From this starting point, we can integrate previous differential equation and obtain 
( ) ∫+⋅−+⋅+−=Π iv jlosjwinji dxxmaxFFFc 0 }),{()(1)( θπθπθ  
If bidder i does not take part in the first auction, given any own known valuation vi 
we can express his expected profits as 
( ) losjdraji FF πθπθ ⋅−+⋅=Π )(1)(  
Thus, an optimal threshold strategy is given by 
( )
( )
drawinjj =−+∫ ))((}),{0 ππθθ
qual inequality. 
Strategies are symmetric for both players, so we can find a symmetric, “natural” cut-
off equilibrium
cFdxxmaxF
FF
dxxmaxFFFc
losjdraj
jlosjwinj
ji
ji
⇔
⇔⋅−+⋅=
=+⋅−+⋅+− ∫
(
)(1)(
}),{()(1)(
)(
)(
0
#
#
πθπθ
θπθπθ
θθ
θθ
 
whenever this threshold strategy is lower than v*. Otherwise, the equation becomes 
a lower-or-e
, which meets  *)*,( θθ
cF drawin =−+ )**)(( ππθθ  
Notice that HF θθθ ≤≤* 7
r
. The former equation has close relation to the symmetric 
cut-off equilib  which both bidders’ valuations follow the 
distribution function 
ium of an isolated auction in
[ ]drawindrawindrawin vxxFxH ππππππ −+−∈−−= *,)),(()( . The 
effect of the interdependence between objects on first auction consists of a shift of 
bidders’ valuations to the right. It is as if valuations increased by the difference between 
ex ante expected pay-off in the second auction for the buyer of the first object and the 
same ex ante expected pay-off if no interdependence existed. 
                                                          
7 This result still holds when taking into consideration the more general case of footnote 5. In the general 
case, the symmetric equilibrium will accomplish with the condition cpF drawin =−⋅⋅+ ))(**)(( ππδθθ . 
Symmetric equ  will not exist if discount factor differs between bidders, but in this paper I am ilibrium
assuming that bidders are symmetric ex ante. 
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 4. Some implications 
Having seen a typical Bayesian “natural” equilibrium path of the complete game, we 
can get some implications that sequential auctioning described above has on the 
com n 
interdependencies among objects are present. A first result states that the first seller is 
always non-worse-off in a sequential auction than in an isolated-auctions benchmark. 
in which winning or losing in the first auction 
would not have any consequences on second auction distributions, and where 
symmetric strategies are played. Then, the probability that both bidders participate in 
the med equilibrium is higher or equal 
than the probability that both bidders take part in the first auction of the benchmark 
game. Besides, first auction seller is ex ante (non-strictly) better off in the original game 
than in the benchmark game. 
Proof: 
se c of the second stage in the original game. It is easy to 
see
petition level and on the expected profits that sellers can obtain, whe
Result 1: 
Consider a BENCHMARK GAME 
 first auction of the original game with the assu
In the benchmark game, both the first and the second auctions are identical to the 
auction that takes place in ca
 that [ ]2*)(1 θF− , the probability that both bidders take part in the first auction of the 
original game, is higher or equal than [ ]2)(1 FF θ− , the probability that both bidders take 
part in the f tion of the ark game. This is due to irst auc benchm *θθ ≥F . 
Besides, bidding function in the first auction of the original game is 
loswin
O vvb ππ −+=)( , while the bidding function in the first auction of the benchmark 
game is vvbB =)( . Re n with 
no reservation price is zero unless more than one bidder takes part in it. Given that both 
participate, seller’s profits equal the minimum of the two bids, a variable that has the 
following distribution and density functions: 
[ ]
call that seller’s profits in a second-price sealed-bid auctio
[ ]2 −=−−= )(1)(2)(;)(11)( xFxfxhxFxH  
Hence, first auction seller’s ex ante expected profits in the original game are 
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[ ] [ ][ ]
[ ] ( )
xdxxFxf
F
vvvvminEvvP
v
loswinloswin
O
=⎟⎟
⎞
⎜
⋅−+−−=
=>>−+−+⋅>>=
∫ **
2121210
)(1)(2
*)(1
)**,},{(*)*,(
θππθ
θθππππθθ
 
[ ] xdxxFxfF
F
v
loswin
loswin
⋅−+−−=
⎟⎠⎜⎝ −
∫ **2
2
)(1)(2*)(1
*)(1
θππθ
θ
whereas first auction seller’s ex ante expected profits in the benchmark game are 
Π
⎜⎛2
[ ] xdxxFxfvvvvminEvvP vB ⋅−=>>⋅>>=Π * )(1)(2),},{(),( θθθθ  FFFF
F
∫2121210 θ
It is clear that the first auction seller obtains higher profits when there are 
interdependencies among objects. However, it is not so clear that the second auction 
sell
mpetition 
e first auct
g a 
result in which the probability of having zero profit for the second seller is higher in the 
orig
can be found in Mi
 more 
Consider the benchmark case of Result 1. Then, assuming
It is clear that 00 Π≥Π . QED 
 
So the first auction seller takes profit of being the first one when it is expected that 
the result of the auction is going to have effects on future valuation distributions. Notice 
that when both bidders take part in the auction, seller extracts the whole bidder’s future 
ex ante surplus difference between having won this first auction and not having done so. 
BO
er in the original game is going to be better off than in the case where the two 
auctions are not interrelated. In the original game, the second seller faces a probably 
lesser co level from the loser of the first auction, but a probably higher 
competition level from the winner of th ion. There is a trade-off between these 
two forces. I have developed some sufficient (not necessary) conditions for yieldin
inal game than in the benchmark game. Two of them come from a proposition that 
ralles (2002) (see Proposition 2 in the appendix). Next one is 
somehow complicated. Finally, I have depicted in a last result sufficient 
conditions for the opposite to hold, that is, making the probability of having zero profit 
for the second seller be lower in the original game than in the benchmark game. 
Result 2: 
GF θθ < ,  if 
( )
)(1 eG−
* cvevvEG
−=> for some ce ≥ , and 
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( )
)(
)/(
)(
1
1
θθ
θθθθ
Gc
ccGc
cGvvEG
−
−
>≤≤
−
− for any ),( Ge θθ ∈  
second-object seller’s ex ante expected profits in the original game will be 
necessarily lower than or equal to the ones in the benchmark game. 
Miralles (2002) proposition 1 (see Proposition 2 in the appendix) can be used to 
state that if the first conditon holds, there is a cut-off equilibrium in which the loser of 
the first auction is for sure not going to participate in the second auction. It remains to 
see if (c,v*) (or alternatively (v*,c) ) is the “natural” equilibrium of the second auction 
whenever th
the original gam
Proof: 
ere has been a loser and a winner in the first auction. This is what the 
second condition guarantees for any possible distribution function F that is first order 
stochastically dominated by G. 
Without loss of generality, call “bidder 1” to the bidder that won the first auction in 
e, and “bidder 2” to the other bidder who lost. Concerning the second 
auction, we have to check that there is no intersection between )(#2 θθ and )(1#1 θθ − in the 
interval ( ]Fe θθ ,∈  ( ),( Ge θ⊂  given our initial assumption). Given that 
)()( 1#1
#
2 FFGF θθθθθθ −=>> , the latter curve must be strictly under the former one on 
the entire interval considered here. Given that )()( 1#2
1#
1 θθθθ −− ≤ always holds, it suffices 
to check that 
( ]FecG θθθθθθθ ,),/()()( 11#2#2 ∈∀=> −−  
As Gθθθθθθθθ <∀>> − ,)(,)( 1#2#2 , the former condition could be expressed as 
∫ − <+ )/(1 )()( θθθθ cG cdxxGG  
Integrating by parts, we get 
∫ − <−− )/(1 1 )()/( θc ∫ −<−− )/(1 1 )()/( θθθ θ
cG
cdxxxgcG , i.e θθ θ
cG
dxxxgccGc  
Applying the definition of conditional expectation, we obtain 
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( )
)(
)/(
)(
)(
)(
1)/(
1
1
θθ
θθ
θθ
θθ
θ
θ
G
ccGc
Gc
dxxxg
cGvvE
cG
G
−
−
−
=≤≤
−
− ∫ − as desired. 
f the first one will 
never take part in the second, due to implied “natural” second-auction equilibrium. In 
case of having had a draw in the first auction, in the sense that none of the bidders took 
part on it, second auction seller faces an auc
c> , 
Hence, if the conditions hold, whenever there is a winner in the first auction, 
second-auction seller will obtain zero profits for sure as the loser o
tion that is equivalent to the one of the 
benchmark game, thus yielding same profits. QED 
 
The idea of this result is very easy. If conditions guaranteeing *vH =θ  hold, then 
the second-auction seller would be in serious trouble compared to a benchmark case in 
which bidders continue being symmetric. These sufficient conditions have to do with 
the
ction omplis
same result. 
Result 3: 
Consider the benchmark case of Result 1. Then, assuming
 strength of the first-auction winner’s distribution. 
However, conditions stated in Result 2 could be thought as rather uninformative, as 
it does not give a precise idea of which kind of distribution fun s acc h with 
them. Therefore, I have developed some “easier” sufficient conditions leading to the 
GF θθ < ,  if 
( )
)(1
*
eG
cvevvEG −
−=> for some , and 
F is strictly convex but 
ce ≥
2
)(
)(3
)(
)(
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛⋅≤
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
xG
xg
dx
xG
xgd
 for any [ ]*,vx Gθ∈  
second-object seller’s ex ante expected profits in the original game will be 
necessarily lower than or equal to the ones in the benchmark game. 
Proof: 
second conditions are 
met, 
As in the previous Result, we just need to show that when 
*vH =θ  is the high “natural” equilibrium threshold value. Take a two-player 
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auction with the same rules but equal distribution functions G. There are at least two 
equilibria: ),( GG θθ (by symmetry) and (c,v*) (by the first con  result). If we 
show that this game has no equilibrium in 
dition of this
( ) ( )*,, vc GG θθ × , then we are done. Recall the 
argument of Result 3: the inverse of the optimal threshold strategy is always higher 
when a bidder faces a “strong” competitor than when facing a “weak” one. Thus, if the 
game with “symmetric strong bidders” has no equilibrium in the area under 
consideration, neither does the game with “strong” and “weak” bidders. 
Define y and x as *vxyG ≤≤≤θ  and )(xG
cy = , and define 
cdxxG
xGxG xG⎠⎝ )()()(
If 0)()( ≤=x
cGcx
x
c −+⎟⎟
⎞
⎜⎜
⎛= ∫ )()(π  
π , then (y,x) is a cut-off equilibrium (inequality only applies when 
x=v*). Notice that both Gx θ= and x=v* meet this result. We need to show that 
*),(0)( vxx Gθπ ∈∀< . Then, differentiate the function to obtain 
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
1)('
2
2
xG
xH
xG
cgxg
xG
cxG
xG
x ≡⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛−=π  
It can be seen that this is strictly negative when Gx θ=  due to convexity of G (see 
Tan and Yilankaya, 2003). Hence, 0,0,0)( →><+ εεεθπ G and 0*)( ≤vπ . In order to 
see *),(0)( vxx Gθπ ∈∀< , it is only sufficient to show that, worsin the t case, that is, 
whenever there is a point where 0)(' =xπ , this point is not a maximum. Denote it as x*, 
so that . Assume that this point exists. We have 0*)( =xH
0*)('0*)('');('
)(
1)(
)( 2 GxG
)()('' ≥⇔≥+−= xHxxH
x
xHxgx ππ  
2
22
2
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
2)()(2)(' xg
xG
xG
gxg
xG
cxGxgxH −
⎟⎟⎠⎜
⎜
⎝⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛+=
 
)(
)(
)(
')(
)()(
)('
)( xG
xcg
xG
cgxg
xG
c
xG
cgxg
xG
c
⎟⎟
⎞
⎜⎜
⎛
⎟⎟
⎞
⎜⎜
⎛+⎟⎟
⎞
⎜⎜c⎜⎜
⎛− ⎠⎝⎠⎝⎠⎝
⎛
⎟⎟
⎞
⎞⎛
⎠⎝
Using convexity of G and the fact that 0*)( =xH , we can simplify to 
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22
2
2
*)(
*)(
*)(*)(4
*)('*)(
*)(*)(
*('
*)(*)(2*)(*)(2*)('
xG
xg
xgxGxg
xcg
G
cgxg
xG
c
xg
xg
xGxgxGxgxH
−≥
≥⎟⎞⎜⎝
⎛⎟
⎠
⎞⎜
⎝
⎛+−
*)('
*)(*)(
*)()
xGx
xG ⎟⎠⎜⎟⎜
−+=
 
This is nonnegative if G meets 
[ ]*,,)(')(4 vxxgxg Gθ∈∀≥ , a condition that is completely equivalen)()( xgxG t to 
[ ]*,,
)(
)(3)(
)(
2
vx
xG
xg
dx
xG
xgd
Gθ∈∀⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛≤
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
. QED 
 
So, if G is “strong” enough but “not too much”, we have this result for sure. We 
uch” the last inequa
restrictive than log-co
understand as “not too m lity condition, which is in fact less 
ncavity of G, which is defined as 
0
)(
)(
≤
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
dx
xG
xgd
 
 We can see as well that there always exists som sible c such that both three 
conditions that are stated at Result 3
 
Result 4: 
e plau
 are compatible. 
Consider the benchmark case of Result 1. Assume that *,
2
3 vc HF <≤ θθ . Then, if F 
hazard-rate dominates the uniform distribution between c and v* on [ ]HF θθ , , i.e. 
[ ]HFxcxxF
xf θθ ,,1
)(
)( ∈∀−≥  
then the ex ante probability of second-auction seller having zero profits is (non-
strictly) higher in the original case than in the benchmark case. 
Proof: 
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The probability of having zero profits for the seller is equal to the probability of not 
having more than one bidder finally in the auction. Thus, we have to check that 
whenever the hazard-rate condition is met, and given our assumptions, then 
 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ])(1)(1*)(1)(1*)()(1 2222 LHFF GFFFFF θθθθθθ −⋅−⋅−+−≥− , i.e 
]Lθ  
The first equation only state ers in the 
second auction is (non-strictly) higher in the benchmark game than in the original game.  
Given that 
[ ] [ ] [1)(1)(1 2 HF GFF θθ −⋅−≥− )(
s that the probability of having two final bidd
cF FF =θθ )( , we can see that c
cFcF FF
F
F
F
−=−=− θθθ
θθ )()(1 , so that 
[ ] [ ]
c
cFFF FFFF
−−=− θθθθ )()(1)(1 2  
On the other hand, as *vH <θ  
L
H
L
LH
L
LLL
ccdxxGcGcdxxGG
H
LH θθθ
θ
θθ ≥
−
=⇔=+ ∫∫ )()()()(
L θ
θ
θ
θθ
θθ
−−=−− 1)(  
Having that , we can follow as cF LH =θθ )(
[ ][ ] [ ] [ ]
c
FFFGF HHH
L
H
HLH
cc −−=−−≤−− θθθθ
θθθθ )()(1)(1)(1)(1  
It is then sufficient to check that 
[ ] [ ]
c
cFF
c
cF HHHFF
−−≥− θθθθθ )()(1)(  F F− θ )(1
which holds for sure if the function [ ] ))(()(1)( xFxH cxxF −−=  is non-strictly 
decreasing on x over the range HF[ ]θθ , . The condition that makes H(x) be decreasing is 
cxxF
xF
xF
xf
−≥−
− 1
)(1
1)(2
)(
)(  
FF
F
FF xxFxFxxF
cFc θθθθθ ≥∀−≥−⇔≥∀≥⇔≥=⇔≤ )(11)(23
2)(
3
2)(
2
3  and 
the hazard-rate dominance condition becomes sufficient. QED 
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Result 5: 
Consider the benchmark case of Result 1. Assume that *vH <θ . If 
[ ]HFxcxx
c
xF
xf θθ ,,1
)(1
)( ∈∀−≤−  
then the ex ante probability of second-auction seller having zero profits is (non-
stric
Opposite to Result 4, in this case we want to check that 
]
Given that 
tly) lower in the original case than in the benchmark case. 
Proof: 
[ ] [ ] [ )(1)(1)(1 2 LHF GFF θθθ −⋅−≤−  
*vH <θ and that any distribution function is non-decreasing: 
cGcGGc θθθθθθθ /)())(() ≤⇔≤−+⇔  
so that 
LL dxxGG
H
L
θθ θθ ()()( =+ ∫ HLLHLLL
[ ] [ ] [ ] )/1()(1)(1)(1 HHLH cFGF θθθθ −⋅−≥−⋅− . 
On the other hand, [ ] [ ] )/1()(1)(1)( 2 FFFFF cFFcF θθθθθ −⋅−=−⇔=  
That means that it is sufficient to check that 
[ ] [ ] )/1()(1)/1()(1 FFHH cFcF θθθθ −−≥−−  
Define the function [ ] )/1()(1)( xcxFxH −−=
e [ ]HF
. If this function is non-strictly 
increasing over the rang θθ , , we are done. And this happens if and only if the 
condition mentioned at the result statement is met. QED 
non-compatible. As they have opposite consequences, they cannot be simultaneously 
met. We see it mathematically. At some point of the proof of Result 4, we had 
 
It is readily seen, and easily understood, that the conditions of Results 4 and 5 are 
cxxF
xF
xF
xf
−≥−
− 1
)(1
1)(2
)(
)(  over the range [ ]HFx θθ ,∈  
This is compatible with the condition of Result 5 if and only if 
c
x
xF
xF ≥−
)(
1)(2  
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, which only happens when cvx H === *θ , something that is impossible given the 
def
 
5. Some conclusions 
ts competition could be 
if there are positive geographical externalities (interdependencies in terms of Gandal, 
1997) betw ies. This 
sequential game could be applied to other cases where wining a contract or an object 
give the new owner advantage when trying to get another one. I use an auction theory 
per her app ould give a 
different light to this issue, but auction theory applied to this field is good in explaining 
effective competition patterns among private firms. 
sequential weakly efficient auctions with participation costs, 
with two potential bidders in each auction and two objects to be sold. Bidders are ex 
ant st auction. There is a positive externality between objects in the 
sense that acquiring the first one gives  
valuation. The model follows the IPV assumption as it focuses on specific uncorrelated 
individual features. It also assumes that each bidder learns his valuation in each auction 
bef ion decision, as in Mene
m’s co
er takes profit of this positive 
externality. Both bidders participate in the first auction with higher probability than if 
no positive externality existed. They also bid more aggressively, as they advance future 
ear
Consequences of the ity on sec d-object seller’s profit are less 
clear. There are two contradictory effects. On one hand, there is a bidder who is 
“str environment. On the 
other hand, the other bidder becomes relatively “weaker”, hence reducing potential 
competition. I have derived some conditions that make one effect outweigh the other. 
inition of c. 
In this paper, I have developed a simple sequential game in order to find out what 
the effects of contracting out local services on privatized marke
een municipalities, due mainly to geographical scale econom
spective. Ot roaches such as contract theory or bargaining games c
I present a model of 
e identical in the fir
the buyer a higher expected second object
ore taking the participat zes and Monteiro (2000), which is 
quite realistic concerning fir st structure. 
I derive as a result of the model that first-object sell
nings. If both bidders participate, first-object seller extracts the whole bidder’s 
expected second-auction profit differential between being a winner in the first auction 
and being a loser. All this is shown in Result 1. 
positive external on
onger”, hence raising expected price if there is a competitive 
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The distribution function of ld be “strong” enough to entirely deter 
competition, as 
the winner cou
in Results 2 and 3, which is a frankly bad result for the second-object 
seller. If this distribution function is not that “strong”, I derive conditions that make 
competition intensity, measured as the probability of having two final bidders, be lower 
(higher) with respect to a no-externality benchmark. This is found in Result 4 (Result 
5). 
An alternative research project could be devoted to explaining why some 
municipalities are pioneering in privatizing services and other ones are followers, from 
the auction theory perspective as well as from other approaches. Also, changes in the 
assumptions underlying this model can be assessed. For instance, auction mechanism 
could be like in Levin and Smith (1994), in the sense that bidders have to pay 
participation costs before learning own valuations. However, this assumption is, from 
my point of view, less realistic concerning local service contracting out. 
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Appendix 
First of all, I present an extension of Tan and Yilankaya (2003) proposition 4, which 
is in turn a generalization of Lemma 1 here. 
Proposition 1: 
Consider a second-price sealed-bid auction of an indivisible object, where there are 
N potential, risk-neutral bidders. There is no reservation price. Participating in the 
auction has a known cost c ( *0 vc << ) for each final participant. Each bidder learns 
his valuation before deciding whether to participate or not in the auction. Each ex ante 
ith-bidder’s valuation is believed by other bidders to follow a distribution Fi over the 
support [0,v*]. Valuations are independent among bidders. Then, if bidders can be 
ordered in a first order stochastic dominance ranking, such that 
[ ]*,0),(...)()( 21 vvvFvFvF N ∈∀≤≤≤  
, then this game has at least a cut-off equilibrium *)*,...,*,(* 21 Nθθθ=Θ that meets 
 *...** 21 Nθθθ ≤≤≤  
Proof: 
We assume, without loss of generality, that bidders are numbered according to the 
first order stochastic dominance ranking. Now, if N=2, the proof is done in Lemma 1, so 
we focus on the cases where N>2. First of all, define an ordered (k)-semi-equilibrium 
 as a k-first-players cut-off equilibrium that would appear if bidders k+1, k+2,…, N 
kept their threshold strategy constant at the values above indicated. Define continuos 
ordered k-semi-equilibrium line as a function that returns for each possible value 
 and some fixed vector 
 )),...,,(),...,,...,,((),...,,( 2121121 Nkk
k
kNkk
k
Nkk
k θθθθθθθθθθθ ++++++ =Θ  
[ ]*,0 vx∈ ),...,( 2 Nk θθ +  an ordered k-semi-equilibrium 
in such a way that the resulting line is continuos and defined on [0,v*]N. Semi-
equilibria always exist in the same way as equilibrium does. A continuous semi-
equilibrium path can always be found as optimal threshold strategies are continuous and 
hence a little change in one of the parameters change the function values smoothly. 
Then the following claims follow: 
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[ ] 12 *,0),...,( −−+ ∈ kNNk vθθ  First claim: If for any parameters there is a continuos k-
semi-equilibrium line such that for any [ ]*,0 vx∈  
kk θθθθθθ ≤≤≤ ),...,,(...),...,,(),...,,( 22221 NkkkNkNk xxx θθθ +++    (1) 
, then for the previously fixed parameters ),...,( 3 Nk θθ +
exists a continuous (k+1)-semi-equilibrium line such that for any 
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Proof: It can be shown, given weak efficiency and the revenue equivalence theorem, 
that bidder i’s expected profits, once he knows his valuation vi and chooses to bid in the 
auction, is equal to 
cdmaxFi
v
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jj −∫ ∏
≠0
}),{( εεθ  
 Each (k)-semi-equilibrium meets then 
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The less-or-equal inequality only applies when the upper bound of the integral is 
equal to v*, as in further equations where the symbol appears in brackets. We define th
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If this function equals zero in x (or is non-positive for x=v*), then we have a (k+1)-
rium )),,...,k θθθθ for the vector ,(),...,,...,,(( 221 xxx NkkkNk ),...,( 2 Nk θθ + .  
efine ),...,( 2 Nkk θθω +  as 
2 vNk ≤+ θθ . We deduce that 
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Given (1), it is seen that ),...,(),...,),,...,(( 222 NkkNkNkk
k
k θθωθθθθωθ +++ ≥ . On the 
other hand, it is obvious that *(vkkθ *),...,,
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Call h
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f Hk. Then, by first order dominance between 
bidders k and k+1, 
k to the maximum element o
0)(1 ≤+ kk hπ . Hence, if 0*)(1 ≤+ vkπ , 
equilibrium 
kkk+  
which meets (2). And if 
we have a (k+1)-semi-
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0*)(1 >+ vkπ *),[ k* vhx ∈  that yields , there exists some point 
the following (k+1)-semi-equilibrium 
 semi-equilibrium also meets (2). The reason is that for any 
, we have for sure , due to the definition of hk and the 
fact that 
2) to all possible cases of
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Notice that this
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*),...,*,( 2 vv Nk
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k ≤+ θθθ . 
 2+kθFinally, it only remains to generalize ( , and to state 
that the (k+1)-semi-equilibrium line obtained is also continuos, which is always possible 
as argued before. DONE 
Second claim: For any [ ] 34 *,0),...,( −∈ NN vθθ , whenever these parameters make 
sense, and in any case when N=3, there exists a continuos (2)-semi-equilibrium line 
such that for any [ ]*,0 vx∈ (just ignore Nθθ ,...,4  if N=3) 
22 xx θθθ ≤ ),...,,(),...,,( 4241 NN θθθ       (3) 
Proof: Define ),...,,( 41 Nx θθω  and ),...,,( 42 Nx θθω  as 
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, where # refers to the optimal threshold strategy. In the plane ),...,,( 4 Nx θθ , bidder 
1’s optimal threshold strategy is closed under [ ] [ ]*),,...,,()., 41 vx NN,(, 41 xc ,..θω θθωθ ×  
and bidder 2 [ ] [ ]*),,...,4 vN,(),...,,(, 242 xxc N θ’s one is closed under θωθθω × . Hence, 
both functions are closed in this plane under the com tersection set pact in
[ ] [ ]*),,...,,(),...,,(, 4241 xx N vc Nθθωθθω × rem, this im
al threshold functions, i.e. a 2-semi-equilibrium, 
must be in this set. In such equilibrium, condition (3) is met for sure. A trivial 
generalization to any possible x holds, and, by analogous argum tation to the one of 
the
the condition. DONE 
ims two and one, we see that we can find a continuos (N-1)-semi-equilibrium 
line  that meets the condition 
. By Brower’s fixed-point theo plies 
that an intersection between both optim
en
 end of claim 1 proof, we can find a continuos (2)-semi-equilibirum line that meets 
By cla
)(1 xN−Θ
[ ]*,0),(...)()( 111211 vxxxx NNNN − ∈∀≤≤≤ −θθθ
that this line intersects with Nth-bidder’s optimal threshold 
strategy in a point N
−−  
 It remains to check 
*)*,...,*,(* 2 θθ1θ=Θ that meets *...** 21 Nθθθ ≤≤≤ . But mimicking 
claim 1 proof except for its last paragraph readily does this. QED 
 
Finally, I present a proof of a versi
Proposition 2: 
Consider a second-price sealed-bid auction of an indivisible object, where there are 
N potential, risk-neutral bidders. There is no reservation price. Participating in the 
auction has a known cost c (
on of Miralles (2002) proposition 1. 
*0 vc << )
ved by other bidde
 for each final participant. Each bidder learns 
his valuation before deciding whether to participate or not in the auction. Each ex ante 
ith-bidder’s valuation is belie rs to follow a differentiable distribution 
Fi over the support [0,v*]. Valuations are independent among bidders. Then, if (and 
only if) there exists some potential bidder k and some number such that ce ≥
( )
)(1 eFk−
* cvevvE kF
−=>  
 28
, the auction has a cut-off equilibrium in which the rest of bidders never participate 
and bidder k participates if and only if his value is greater than c. 
Proof: 
( )
cdxxFccF
cdxxFeeFc
eFeF
xxf
eF
cvevvE
v
c kk
v
e kk
v
e
kk
e k
k
≤+⇒
⇒=+⇔=⎥⎦
−−⇔−
−=>
∫
∫
∫
*
**
)()(
)()(
)(1)(1
)(
)(1
*
 
This implies that, if bidder k plays a threshold strategy c and the rest of bidders 
except for one of them play a threshold strategy of v* (hence they do not participate in 
any case), the remaining bidde
dxxFeeFvvFv
cdxxxfvcv
dx
e kkk
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r would obtain non-positive expected profits in case of 
taking part in the auction. His best response would be a threshold strategy of v* (so 
nev
ipate in s valuation is higher than c. Hence, his optimal 
threshold strategy would be precisely c. This completes the equilibrium. QED 
er participating as well). If all bidders except for k never participate, k would 
partic  the auction whenever hi
 29
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